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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Jason A. Hotchkiss appeals from the district court's order revoking his probation
and executing, without reduction, the underlying consecutive unified sentences of ten
years, with four years fixed, and ten years, with five years fixed.

On appeal,

Mr. Hotchkiss asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court has denied him due process of law
and equal protection by refusing to augment the record on appeal with transcripts of his
change of plea, sentencing, and rider review hearings.

He further asserts that the

district court abused its discretion when, in light of the mitigating circumstances known
to it, it revoked his probation and executed the underlying sentence without reduction.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This case began when Mr. Hotchkiss was charged by Information with five
counts of grand theft.

(R., pp.16-18.)

A plea agreement was reached between the

parties. The terms of the agreement were as follows:
[T]he defendant wi" be pleading guilty to Count I and Count V but the
defendant wi" pay restitution on a" 5 counts. The defendant wi" have a
substance abuse evaluation and PSI done before sentencing. The
defendant wi" testify at any trial of co-defendants. The fines and fees wi"
be left in the Court's discretion, plus standard court costs and public
defender reimbursement. The defendant will be incarcerated for a period
of 14 years with 4 years fixed and 10 years indeterminate. The State will
not request imposition but will cap as retained jurisdiction. That sentence
is to run concurrent with each case. When the defendant enters his plea
the State wi" stipulate that the defendant's bond will be reduced to
$2,500.00.

1

(R., p.20.1)

'GUILTY.'"

Pursuant to that agreement, Mr. Hotchkiss "entered a plea [sic] of
(R., p.21. 2 )

Following his guilty pleas, Mr. Hotchkiss failed to appear at

sentencing, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. (R., p.30.) At a later hearing, the
State announced that it was "no longer bound to the recommendations." (R., p.35.)
At the sentencing hearing, both defense counsel and Mr. Hotchkiss provided
corrections to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI). (R., pp.37-38.)
At sentencing, the State requested concurrent unified sentences of fourteen years, with
four years fixed. (R., p.38.) Defense counsel requested "[t]hat the defendant be sent
on a rider." Mr. Hotchkiss then made a statement, the substance of which is unknown.3
(R., p.38.) Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with

four years fixed, on count I, and a consecutive unified sentence of ten years, with five
years fixed. The district court retained jurisdiction. (R., p.38.) Following Mr. Hotchkiss'
rider, the district court suspended both sentences, and placed Mr. Hotchkiss on
probation for a period of ten years. (R., pp.65-72.)
Just over two years after he was placed on probation, Mr. Hotchkiss was
accused of violating six conditions of his probation.

(R., pp.74-78.)

Without any

agreement as to disposition, Mr. Hotchkiss agreed to admit to four of the six violations,
in exchange for the State dismissing the two remaining alleged violations. (Tr.1 0/18/11,
p.5, Ls.15-22.)

Pursuant to that agreement, Mr. Hotchkiss admitted to violating his

probation by: (1) committing the crime of driving without privileges; (2) failing to attend
the work readiness class after being terminated from his job; (3) failing to report and

Mr. Hotchkiss cites to the Court Minutes because his request for transcripts from the
guilty plea, sentencing, and rider review hearings was denied by the Idaho Supreme
Court following the State's objection. (Order (August 28,2012).)
2 See note 1, supra.
3 See note 1, supra.
1
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provide truthful and accurate information to the probation department; and (4) failing to
pay restitution. (Tr.1 0/18/11, p.8, L.2 - p.9, L.10.)
At the disposition hearing, the State requested that the sentences be executed.
(Tr.12/19/11, p.8, L.22 - p.10, L.8.)

Defense counsel asked that probation be

reinstated, or alternatively, that the district court retain jurisdiction again. (Tr.12/19/11,
p.10, L.10 - p.12, L.13.) Ultimately, the district court revoked probation and executed
the

underlying

sentences

without

reduction.

(Tr.12/19/11,

p.i?,

Ls.14-1?)

Mr. Hotchkiss filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's order revoking
probation. (R., p.153.)
On appeal, Mr. Hotchkiss filed a motion to augment the appellate record
requesting the preparation of four additional transcripts, specifically those involving the
change of plea hearing, the original sentencing hearing, the rider review hearing, and
the evidentiary hearing on the probation violations for which his probation was revoked.
(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support
Thereof.)

The State filed a partial objection to the Motion, agreeing that it was

appropriate to augment with a transcript of the evidentiary hearing, but objecting to the
other requested transcripts. (Objection in part to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend
the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof.") The Idaho Supreme Court
then issued an Order granting the Motion only as to the transcript of the evidentiary
hearing, and denying it as to the other requested transcripts. (Order (August 28,2012).)
Mr. Hotchkiss then filed a renewed motion with respect to the transcript from his original
sentencing hearing.

(Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing

Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof.)

The State objected to this Motion

(Objection to "Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and

3

Statement in Support Thereof"), and the Idaho Supreme Court denied it.
(November 9, 2012).)

4

(Order

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Hotchkiss due process and equal
protection when it denied his motion to augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Hotchkiss' probation
and failed to reduce his sentences sua sponte upon revoking probation?

5

ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Hotchkiss Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts
A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal.

The only way a court can constitutionally

preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.
In this case, Mr. Hotchkiss filed a Motion to Augment, requesting various
transcripts and arguing that, when determining whether to revoke probation, a district
court can consider all of the hearings before and after sentencing.

On appeal,

Mr. Hotchkiss challenges the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the
transcripts.

Mr. Hotchkiss asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the

district court's asserted failure to reduce his sentence upon revoking probation because
that decision was made after the original sentencing hearing, and the district court could
have, therefore, relied on its memory of the hearings in question when it decided to
revoke probation and execute the underlying sentence. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme
Court erred in denying Mr. Hotchkiss' request. 4

The arguments set forth herein were recently rejected by the Idaho Court of Appeals.
See State v. Morgan, _ Idaho _ (Ct. App. July 10, 2012), rev. pending. Because the
Idaho Supreme Court has yet to rule on the arguments, Mr. Hotchkiss maintains that the
Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in Morgan was wrongly decided.
4
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B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Hotchkiss Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The
Requested Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Hotchkiss With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit-Based Appellate Review Of His
Claims

The Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art.
I § 13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additiona"y, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State,
132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is statutory. See I.C. § 19-2801.
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, such transcript
must be created at county expense.
rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a).

Idaho court

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the production of

transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further,

"[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .... " Id.
Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be

7

prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases.
The first is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses
are interpreted broadly.

Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants and

those with financial means is not tolerated. The second limits the states' obligation to
provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do not have to provide
indigent defendants with everything they request.

In order to meet the constitutional

mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must provide indigent
defendants with appellate records unless some or all of the requested materials are
unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that time, the
State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase

8

transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court affirmed its holding in
Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be
9

accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigence. In that
case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of his
conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure for determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard.
"Under the present standard ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions
of error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute
their appeal."

Draper, 372 U.S. 494.

The Supreme Court first expanded upon its

statement in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent
alternative is available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all
of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of
the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court u!timately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
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Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument that
he needs the requested items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the
State opposes the defendant's requests, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.

This authority has been

recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals.

See

Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App.
2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007).

An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed.

"It is well established that an

appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of
the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999). If the transcripts are missing,
but the record contains court minutes, they may be sufficient so that a meaningful
review is possible, although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that
appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for
this Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489,491 (Ct. App. 1999).

11

In this case, Mr. Hotchkiss presents on appeal the question of whether the district
court erred by revoking his probation and by failing to sua sponte reduce his sentences
when it revoked his probation. The transcript of the February 4, 2008, change of plea
hearing is necessary because, at the hearing, the minutes reflect that Mr. Hotchkiss was
"sworn and examined as a witness in [his] own behalf and for information of the Court,"
which was followed by Mr. Hotchkiss' entry of guilty pleas.

(R, pp.20-21.)

It is not

possible to tell what level of responsibility Mr. Hotchkiss took when he pled guilty, nor is

it possible to know what "information" was provided to the district court during the
change of plea hearing because this Court denied his motion to augment with a copy of
the transcript. (Order (August 28, 2012).) Additionally, a transcript of the November 3,
2008, sentencing hearing is necessary because it included corrections to the PSI, as
well as a "[sJtatement made by the defendant," the contents of which are unknown
because this Court denied his motion to augment with a copy of the transcript.

(R, pp.37-38; Order (August 28, 2012); Order (November 9, 2012).)

Finally, the

transcript of the June 1, 2009, rider review hearing is necessary on appeal because that
hearing included the presentation of information concerning programs completed after
the Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI) was
prepared, as well as a "[s]tatement by the defendant," the contents of which are
unknown because this Court denied his motion to augment with a copy of the transcript.

(R, pp.58-59; Order (August 28, 2012).)

If Mr. Hotchkiss fails to provide the appellate

court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply and Mr. Hotchkiss'
claims will not be addressed on their actual merits.

If it is state action alone which

prevents his access to the requested items, then such action is a violation of due
process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer apply.
12

All three of the requested transcripts are within the scope of appellate review.
The transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all proceedings
following sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately revoked
probation. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine
the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. We base
our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation.") (emphasis
added). Furthermore, as the Supreme Court explained in State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho
149 (1986),
[I]n the process of determining whether an individual's probation should be
revoked, the trial court "necessarily must be permitted to evaluate a broad
range of information about the defendant[ ] .. "
Very little information
about a defendant will be irrelevant to the effort of the law to individualize
treatment of convicted persons."

Chapman, 111 Idaho at 153 (quoting State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 17 (1969)) (bracket
and emphases in original). Additionally, failure to include a transcript on appeal results
in the application of a presumption that the missing transcript supports the actions of the
district court. See State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Burdett has
failed to include the transcript from his change of plea hearing wherein, according to the
district court minutes, he was examined by the court regarding his guilty plea. Portions
of a transcript missing on appeal are presumed to support the actions of the district
court.").
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of
proceedings on appeal.

The decision to deny Mr. Hotchkiss' Motion to Augment will
13

render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts
support the district court's order revoking probation. This functions as a procedural bar
to the review of Mr. Hotchkiss' appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore,
Mr. Hotchkiss should either be provided with the requested transcripts, or the
presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Hotchkiss With
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated against the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the United
States Supreme Court reasoned that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably
related to due process that the denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a
hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court also stated that, under the facts
of Powell "the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to make
an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [and that to] hold otherwise would be to
ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that there are certain immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member
of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 65 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)).
In Doug/as v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny in determining that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants with
counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of Douglas

14

was extended to include the right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel.
According to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Doug/as that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trialCwould be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.

According to the United States Supreme Court, to be constitutionally effective
appellate counsel must make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in
support of the best arguments to be made. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967).

In Anders, the Court held that the constitutional requirements of sUbstantial

equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an active
advocate on behalf of his client . . . . [counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." /d.; see also Banuelos v. State,
127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested
transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination
of the case, and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether
there is factual support for the arguments made.

Therefore, Mr. Hotchkiss has not

obtained a full review of the court proceedings based on the merits and cannot receive
the effective assistance of counsel that is guaranteed by the Constitution.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held

the starting point of evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel
in a criminal action is the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION.

These standards offer further insight into the role and

responsibilities of defense counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
15

Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . .. Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-S.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation.

Further, appel/ate counsel is unable to advise

Mr. Hotchkiss on the probable role the transcripts may play in this appeal.
Mr. Hotchkiss is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the requested
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Hotchkiss his

constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts, and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Hotchkiss's Probation
And Executed His Underlying, Consecutive Sentences Of Ten Years, With Four Years
Fixed, And Ten Years, With Five Years Fixed
Mr. Hotchkiss asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked
his probation and executed his underlying, consecutive sentences of ten years, with four
years fixed, and ten years, with five years fixed, without any reduction. The standards
of appellate review for such claims on appeal were set forth in the Idaho Court of
Appeals' opinion in State v. Hoskins:
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When a trial court revokes a defendant's probation, the court possesses
authority under I.C.R. 35 to sua sponte reduce the sentence. The
decision whether to do so is committed to the discretion of the court. Rule
35 also allows the defendant to file a motion for reduction of a sentence
within fourteen days after issuance of an order revoking probation, and
Hoskins filed such a motion here. A motion for a sentence reduction
under this rule is essentially a request for leniency which is addressed to
the sound discretion of the sentencing court. On appeal, our criteria for
review of rulings on Rule 35 motions are the same as those applied in
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.
The
defendant bears the burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonably
harsh in light of the primary objective of protecting society and the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. Our focus on review is
upon the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. When
we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of
probation, we do not base our review upon only the facts existing when
the sentence was imposed. Rather, we examine all the circumstances
bearing upon the decision to revoke probation and require execution of the
sentence, including events that occurred between the original
pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation of probation.
State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672 (Ct. App. 1998) (internal citations omitted).

During his allocution at the probation disposition hearing, Mr. Hotchkiss provided
a substantial amount of information in mitigation, telling the district court,
I never missed any monthly appointments. I never missed any drug tests,
any hair follicles, never had any dirty UAs.
I did all my classes. I paid for them on my own, plus paying my bills.
You know, I was - I was working hard. I was putting in over 280 hours a
month, you know, working six days a week, pius doing my classes four
days a week. I was forking out over $400 a week just in classes and
urinalyses. I take [sic] three - three UAs a week for the first year and a
half I was out.
I got fired from my job at Stanley Hay. It was more of a personal vendetta
than, you know, I should have gotten fired.
I should have gotten
disciplinary and gotten three days off. And, you know, it wasn't really my
fault. It turned out to be a mechanical fault. I pulled the E-brake too hard
and it came disconnected, and that's why the forklift rolled off the back the dump truck. But, you know, the old me, after I got fired, because I was
pretty tore [sic] up after that, the old me would have went [sic] back to the
old, you know, stealing, getting money. I would have went [sic] back, you
know, using drugs, alcohol, any excuse to, you know, to get away, and I
never gave up. I went out. I signed up [with] all the temp services. I got
college here and there. I had job interviews. I had multiple job interviews
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but a lot of them, you know, I was - when it says, "Are you a felon?" I
always put - I would explain upon interview. And when I'm interviewed
they asked what my felony is, and I told them grand theft, and most of
them tell me that they can't hire me because their insurance won't cover
me. So I've been turned down a lot just because of my - my past, my
crime, what I'm on probation for. But I never gave up. I still tried. Went to
the library every day. I live right by the library. I get free internet access
to go there. Get on the internet, fill out job applications that way.
My ex-girlfriend didn't want me to get into any more trouble, so she bought
me a mountain bike. I have a mountain bike now.
I was supposed to start at Jayco Trailer July 7th, which I got picked up on
July 6th, and my probation officer knew that. I had the job verification form
already filled out. I handed it to her. I'm hoping to follow up on that when I
get - upon my release. And if, you know, they say no, then 1'/1 just sign up
for a/l the temp services again, and get hustling on trying to find a job.
And I just want one more chance. You know, like I said, I was working
really hard out there. I was really trying. You know, I'm not perfect. I'm
far from perfect, but I really am trying, and I hope that you reinstate me on
probation.
(Tr.12/19/11, p.12, L.19 - p.15, L.3.)
Mr. Hotchkiss first accepted responsibility when he admitted to investigating
officers that he had committed three of the crimes charged.

(Supplemental Incident

Report, dated 11/16/2007 (appended to 3/12/08 PSI), p.1 (admitting to crimes against
two of the victims); Supplemental Incident Report, dated 10/4/2007 (appended to
3/12/08 PSI) (admitting to crime against a third victim).)

He again accepted

responsibility when he pled guilty, and again when he admitted to violating his
probation. He further accepted responsibility when, at his allocution on the probation
violations, he told the district court, "Your Honor, I don't want to sit here and justify my
QUI position, in driving in the first place, no matter what the circumstance was."
(Tr.12/19/11, p.12, Ls.15-18.)

He expressed remorse and regret for these offenses

(and uncharged misconduct of which his father was a victim) when he stated, "I hate
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myself for what I did. But I have to learn to forgive myself and move forward in my life,
so have my parents." (PSI (12/13/11), p.5.)
The crimes for which Mr. Hotchkiss pled guilty were the direct result of his
relapse with methamphetamine, which followed three years of sobriety. Following his
relapse, he quit his job and "went down hill [sic] fast." According to Mr. Hotchkiss, his
crimes occurred as follows:
One night I was out walking my dog and I went to check my mail and
someone elses [sic] mail box was open. So I pulled out their mail and
went through it and found some blank check's [sic] in there so over the
next week I tryed [sic] to cash them. I was onle [sic] able to cash a
couple. If I had been sobber [sic] I probably wouldn't even [have] had the
thought about doing that.
(PSI (3/12/08), p.2.) Mr. Hotchkiss acknowledged his methamphetamine addiction, and
expressed a desire for treatment. (PSI (3/12/08), p.15.)
While Mr. Hotchkiss was on probation, he completed Early Recovery and
Relapse Prevention. In explaining his plan for continuing to remain sober, he wrote, "I
went on a reyder [sic] and learned alot [sic] about myself and have aplied [sic] those
tools to staying sober today. I just don't want that life any more [sic]. I love being sober
now.

It's a great life."

(PSI (12/13/11), p.8.)

Furthermore, while on probation,

Mr. Hotchkiss was not accused of committing any new felony offenses. (PSI (12/13/11),
p.10.)
In light of the mitigating circumstances, including his continued sobriety,
acceptance of responsibility, and the fact that he committed no new felonies while on
probation, Mr. Hotchkiss asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked his probation and executed the underlying, consecutive sentences without
reduction.
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CONCLUSION
Hotchkiss respectfully requests that this Court order that he be placed on
probation in this case.

In the alternative, he requests that this Court order that his

consecutive sentences run concurrently, otherwise reduce his underlying sentences as
it deems appropriate, or remand this matter to the district court for a new probation
disposition hearing.
DATED this 16th day of November, 2012.

~,SPENpER J. HAHN

lJept1(y State Appellate Public Defender
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